\u3cem\u3eState v. Neil\u3c/em\u3e: Approaching the Desired Balance Between Peremptory Challenges and Racial Equality in Jury Selection by Perloff, John W.
University of Miami Law Review 
Volume 39 Number 4 Article 7 
7-1-1985 
State v. Neil: Approaching the Desired Balance Between 
Peremptory Challenges and Racial Equality in Jury Selection 
John W. Perloff 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr 
Recommended Citation 
John W. Perloff, State v. Neil: Approaching the Desired Balance Between Peremptory Challenges and 
Racial Equality in Jury Selection, 39 U. Miami L. Rev. 777 (1985) 
Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol39/iss4/7 
This Casenote is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Miami School of Law 
Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law Review by an authorized 
editor of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact 
library@law.miami.edu. 
State v. Neil: Approaching the Desired
Balance Between Peremptory Challenges
and Racial Equality in Jury Selection
I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................... 777
II. THE BASIC CONFLICT AND SOME ATTEMPTS AT RESOLUTIONS .................. 778
A. The Swain v. Alabama Resolution ................................... 779
B. The W heeler-Soares Alternative ..................................... 781
C. The People v. Thompson Innovations ................................ 785
D. The Supreme Court's Position ...................................... 786
III. A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS ................................................ 787
A. The Basis of an Appeal ............................................ 787
B. The Proper Balance ................................................ 792
IV . T HE N eil D ECISION ..................................................... 794
V. A PRACTICAL ANALYSIS .................................................. 798
A. A Comparative Commentary on Wheeler, Soares and Neil ............. 798
B. A Forecast of Practical Workability ................................. 804
C. A Proposed Rule Change ........................................... 807
V I. C ONCLUSION ............................................................ 808
I. INTRODUCTION
An all-white jury convicted Jack Neil, a black man, of second
degree murder and unlawful possession of a firearm.' The attor-
neys chose Neil's jury from a pool that consisted of thirty-one
whites and four blacks. Over the objections of the defense, the
state exercised peremptory challenges2 to remove the first three
blacks called.3 After the prosecution removed the third black pro-
spective juror,4 the defendant moved to strike the jury pool, claim-
ing that the state was using its challenges in a constitutionally im-
proper manner.5 The court denied the motion, holding that the
1. The charges grew out of Neil's shooting of a black Haitian immigrant. The primary
issue before the jury was whether Neil had acted in self-defense. Brief for Petitioner at 6-7,
State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1984).
2. A peremptory challenge is "[a] challenge to a juror to be exercised by a party to a
civil action or criminal prosecution without assignment of reason or cause." BALLENTINE'S
LAW DICTIONARY 933 (3d ed. 1969).
3. The state used only four peremptory challenges throughout jury selection. Brief for
Petitioner at 3, State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1984).
4. The state asked no questions of this prospective juror before peremptorily challeng-
ing her. She was a single elementary school teacher who knew no one involved in the crimi-
nal proceeding. Brief for Petitioner at 4, State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1984).
5. Counsel for Neil argued that the state's use of peremptory challenges in this fashion
violated the defendant's sixth amendment right to trial by an impartial jury.
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state need not explain its peremptory challenges. Nevertheless, the
court granted each side five additional peremptory challenges, and
the defense used all of them to strike intervening prospective ju-
rors in an unsuccessful attempt to reach the remaining black in the
jury pool." The district court affirmed Neil's conviction, but recog-
nized that the issue presented was "particularly troublesome and
• . . capable of repetition."'7 The court, therefore, certified the fol-
lowing question to the Supreme Court of Florida as one of great
public importance: "Absent the criteria established in Swain v. Al-
abama. . ., may a party be required to state the basis for the exer-
cise of a peremptory challenge?" 8 The Supreme Court of Florida
answered the question with a qualified affirmative and held, re-
versed: The Florida Constitution's guarantee of the right to an im-
partial jury' prohibits racially discriminatory use of peremptory
challenges. Evidence of a party's practice in a single proceeding
can be sufficient to compel that party to state the basis for particu-
lar questioned challenges. State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1984).
II. THE BASIC CONFLICT AND SOME ATTEMPTS AT RESOLUTIONS
The significance of this decision derives from its place within
an historical progression toward the resolution of a basic conflict.
Specifically, this conflict is between the right to unbridled use of
peremptory challenges and the fight against racial discrimination
in our judicial system. Peremptory challenges are rooted in ancient
English common law;10 since their introduction, it has been axio-
matic that peremptory challenges are not subject to judicial in-
quiry. The struggle for racial equality in our courts had its consti-
tutional beginnings with the passage of the fourteenth amendment
in 1868;"1 since then, it has been equally axiomatic that our legal
system does not permit racial discrimination. 2 Within the context
6. The attorneys eventually selected the remaining black as an alternate juror, but the
alternate juror never served on the jury in this case.
7. Neil v. State, 433 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983).
8. Id.
9. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16.
10. For a concise account of the history and purposes of peremptory challenges, see J.
VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES: OUR UNCERTAIN COMMITMENT TO REPRESENTATIVE
PANELS 145-51 (1977).
11. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
12. See, e.g., Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940);
Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935); Carter v. Texas, 177 U.S. 442 (1900); Strauder v.
West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
[Vol. 39:777
STATE v. NEIL
of jury selection, these two axioms's unveil an inherent contradic-
tion in the system. Ideally, they represent absolute discretion and
the forbidden exercise of discretion, both of which are mutually
exclusive in their pure forms. This conceptual exclusivity is largely
responsible for the difficulty in developing a theoretically consis-
tent, yet workable, balance between the two."
A. The Swain v. Alabama Resolution
The Supreme Court of the United States first faced this
troublesome conflict twenty years ago in Swain v. Alabama.'5 In
Swain, a jury convicted a black man of raping a white woman and
sentenced him to death. The state peremptorily struck all six eligi-
ble blacks in the jury pool, resulting in an all-white jury. 6 Addi-
tionally, in Talladega County where the state tried Swain, no black
had served on any petit jury for at least fifteen years1 7 despite the
fact that each jury pool included an average of six to seven
blacks. 8 After an in-depth recounting of the "very old credentials"
of the peremptory challenge,' 9 the Supreme Court of the United
States held that a defendant in any single case cannot overcome
the presumption "that the prosecutor is using the State's chal-
lenges to obtain a fair and impartial jury."20 The Court recognized
the fact that peremptory challenges are "frequently exercised on
13. In the interests of simplicity and manageability, the basic propositions that "pe-
remptory challenges are exempt from judicial inquiry" and that "discrimination based on
race is not permitted in our courts" are referred to throughout this Note as the "two axi-
oms." Cf. Note, Peremptory Challenge-Systematic Exclusion of Prospective Jurors on the
Basis of Race, 39 Miss. L.J. 157, 158 (1967) (referring to the essential conflict between two
opposing maxims).
14. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 222 (1965) ("The challenge, pro tanto, would
no longer be peremptory."); Neil v. State, 433 So. 2d 51, 52 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) ("When
peremptory challenges are subjected to judicial scrutiny, they will no longer be
peremptory.").
15. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
16. See id. at 205. There were actually eight blacks in the original jury pool, but two
were exempt. The prosecutor removed the remaining six under Alabama's "struck" jury sys-
tem, a special form of peremptory challenge. Under this system, the defense strikes two
people and the prosecution strikes one person in alternating turns until only twelve people
are left in the jury pool. Id. at 210.
17. Id. at 205. A petit jury is the ordinary jury of 12 persons for the trial in a civil or
criminal action. The title distinguishes it from the grand jury.
18. Swain also challenged the proportional number of blacks on his grand and petit
jury venires. See id. at 205-06.
19. See id. at 212-21.
20. See id. at 221-22. It is important to note here that Swain's only claim in this litiga-
tion arose out of the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause. See infra note 72 and
accompanying text.
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grounds normally thought irrelevant to legal proceedings or official
action, namely, the race, religion, nationality, occupation or affilia-
tions of people summoned for jury duty.
'21
The Court did note, however, that "the purposes of the pe-
remptory challenge [could be] perverted. 22 This would be the case
where a defendant could establish that: (1) a particular prosecutor,
(2) in every type of case, (3) under every set of circumstances, and
(4) for an extended provable period of time, (5) has peremptorily
excused black persons from venires with the result that no black
person has ever served on a petit jury in a case tried by that prose-
cutor.2 8 Because the defendant in Swain could not show by a com-
plete record that the prosecutor was responsible for the absence of
blacks on juries for fifteen years, the Court found that he had not
carried his burden of proof.24 Thus, through the artifice of a con-
clusive presumption, the Court effectively resolved the conflict in
the case of a single defendant in favor of peremptory challenges.25
The Swain decision immediately provoked a considerable
amount of comment, most of which was critical.2 6 The thirteen
years that followed the decision appeared to bear out much of the
criticism-abuses continued 27 and no litigant was able to meet the
21. 380 U.S. at 220.
22. Id. at 224. Only four members of the Court joined this section of the opinion with-
out reservation. See id. at 228 (Harlan, J., concurring). Nevertheless, courts have generally
accepted it as the operative part of the Court's holding. See, e.g., McCray v. Abrams, 750
F.2d 1113, 1130 (2d Cir. 1984) ("Part III of the Swain opinion, although dictum, set forth
the circumstances that a defendant would have to show in order to subject the prosecution's
use of peremptories to inquiry by the court. Although the standards set by Swain have
proven to be practically impossible to meet, they were nevertheless enunciated.").
23. This is the statement of the Swain test found in the intermediate appellate court
opinion. Neil v. State, 433 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983).
24. See 380 U.S. at 224-28.
25. In achieving this "resolution," however, the Court avoided the basic conflict alto-
gether by interposing evidentiary problems. As Justice Goldberg astutely pointed out in his
dissenting opinion, any true resolution to a head-on conflict between these axioms would
require the nonconstitutional axiom (inviolate peremptory challenge) to give way to the con-
stitutional one (inviolate racial equality). Id. at 244 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
26. See, e.g., Martin, The Fifth Circuit and Jury Selection Cases: The Negro Defen-
dant and His Peerless Jury, 4 Hous. L. REV. 448 (1966); The Supreme Court, 1964 Term, 79
HAnv. L. REV. 103, 135-39 (1965); Note, Fair Jury Selection Procedures, 75 YALE L.J. 322
(1965); Comment, Swain v. Alabama: A Constitutional Blueprint for the Perpetuation of
the All-White Jury, 52 VA. L. REV. 1157 (1966).
27. See J. VAN DYKE, supra note 10, at 152-60. The criticisms of Swain also continued.
See, e.g., Brown, McGuire, & Winters, The Peremptory Challenge as a Manipulative De-
vice in Criminal Trials: Traditional Use or Abuse, 14 NEW ENG. L. REV. 192 (1978); Note,
The Jury: A Reflection of the Prejudices of the Community, 20 HASTINGS L.J. 1417 (1969);
Note, Peremptory Challenge-Systematic Exclusion of Prospective Jurors on the Basis of
Race, 39 Miss. L.J. 157 (1967); Note, Limiting the Peremptory Challenge: Representation of
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heavy burden of the Swain test.2 8 The reality of a right without a
reasonably obtainable remedy led commentators to advocate re-
evaluation of the Swain decision.2 9 Indeed, other Supreme Court
decisions, bearing tangentially on discrimination in the selection of
petit juries, suggested that perhaps the Court was itself undertak-
ing such a reevaluation.30 Against this background, the Supreme
Court of California handed down the landmark decision of People
v. Wheeler."1
B. The Wheeler-Soares Alternative
In Wheeler, a jury convicted two black men of murdering a
white grocery store owner in the course of a robbery. During jury
selection, the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to remove
every prospective black juror from the box,32 resulting in a panel of
twelve white jurors. The prosecutor struck the blacks after little or
no questioning,3 and without attempting to challenge them for
cause. The defense counsel moved for a mistrial twice during the
selection process, but the trial court denied the motions and held
that the prosecutor need not explain his conduct. On appeal, the
Supreme Court of California reversed the decision. The court held
Groups on Petit Juries, 86 YALE L.J. 1715 (1977); Comment, A Case Study of the Peremp-
tory Challenge: A Subtle Strike at Equal Protection and Due Process, 18 ST. Louis U.L.J.
662 (1974); Comment, The Prosecutor's Exercise of the Peremptory Challenge to Exclude
Nonwhite Jurors: A Valued Common Law Privilege in Conflict with the Equal Protection
Clause, 46 U. CIN. L. REV. 554 (1977).
28. People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 286, 583 P.2d 748, 768, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 909
(1978). During this period, many criminal defendants tried unsuccessfully to meet the
Swain test. See, e.g., State v. Booker, 517 S.W.2d 937 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974) (holding insuffi-
cient showing where a news reporter testified that over a 19-month period prosecutors pe-
remptorily challenged 68% of the blacks on venires); Ridley v. State, 475 S.W.2d 769 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1972) (holding insufficient showing where prosecutor struck seven of ten blacks
on a 32 member venire to get an all-white jury, where three defense attorneys with com-
bined experience of 60 years testified that this prosecutor customarily excluded blacks and
where prosecutor testified that it was "common sense" to exclude blacks where the accused
was black and the victim white).
It is doubtful whether anyone has ever really met the Swain test; at most, it has been
satisfied twice in relation to the same prosecutor. State v. Washington, 375 So. 2d 1162 (La.
1979); State v. Brown, 371 So. 2d 751 (La. 1979).
29. See, e.g., J. VAN DYKE, supra note 10, at 166-69.
30. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145
(1968); infra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
31. 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978).
32. Although the record was not entirely clear, it appeared that the prosecutor removed
seven blacks. Id. at 265, 583 P.2d at 753, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 895.
33. The prosecutor only asked four brief questions of one black prospective juror, two
questions of another, and no questions of at least three other black prospective jurors. Id. at
263 n.2, 583 P.2d at 753 n.2, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 894 n.2.
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that peremptory challenges based solely on group bias34 violate the
right to an impartial jury guaranteed in the state constitution and
are therefore impermissible."
The Wheeler court based its decision on the guarantee to a
jury drawn from a "representative cross-section of the commu-
nity."3 6 The court fashioned a new test for courts to apply in Cali-
fornia 87 that would permit a party to rebut the initial presumption
of propriety if peremptory challenges are misused in a single case.
This test places the burden on the movant to show: (1) on as com-
plete a record as possible, (2) that the persons challenged were
members of a cognizable group, and (3) that there is a strong likeli-
hood that a party challenged such persons because of their group
association rather than because of any specific bias.3 8 If the trial
court is convinced that the movant has made this prima facie
showing, the burden shifts to the party who made the challenges to
show that he did not exercise the challenges in question on the
basis of group bias alone.3 If that party is unable to justify the
questioned challenges, jury selection must begin anew with a new
jury pool. 0
Shortly after Wheeler's repudiation of Swain, the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts followed California's lead. In
Commonwealth v. Soares,'1 a jury convicted three black men of
the first degree murder of a white college football player. At trial,
34. Specific bias is the bias of a juror "concerning the particular case on trial or the
parties or witnesses thereto"; on the other hand, group bias is juror bias that arises out of
membership in an "identifiable group, distinguished on racial, religious, ethnic, or similar
grounds." Id. at 274-76, 583 P.2d at 760-61, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 902.
35. Id. at 276-77, 583 P.2d at 761-62, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 903.
36. The court began by analyzing a string of federal cases (in order): Smith v. Texas,
311 U.S. 128 (1940); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942); Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co.,
328 U.S. 217 (1946); Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946); Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S.
493 (1972); and Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975). Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 267-70, 583
P.2d 755-57, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 896-98. Fearing the Supreme Court of the United States
might not agree, .the court ultimately rested its decision on analogous state constitutional
provisions that the court had interpreted in light of the federal cases.
37. In effect, the Supreme Court of California interpreted its state constitution to pro-
vide more protection to its California citizens than the federal constitution presently pro-
vides to citizens in federal courts. This has become a trend among the states. See Linde,
First Things First: Rediscovering the States' Bills of Rights, 9 U. BALT. L. REV. 379 (1980)..
38. 22 Cal. 3d at 280, 583 P.2d at 764, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 905.
39. Id. at 281-82, 583 P.2d at 764-65, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 906. The party whose peremp-
tory challenges are under scrutiny need not give reasons equivalent to those required for a
challenge for cause; he must simply satisfy the trial court that he exercised the challenges
for reasons of specific, instead of group, bias.
40. Id. at 282, 583 P.2d at 765, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 906.
41. 377 Mass. 461, 387 N.E.2d 499, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979).
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the prosecutor peremptorily challenged twelve of thirteen black
members of the jury pool,42 representing ninety-two percent of the
available black jurors, while striking only thirty-four percent of the
available white jurors.43 As a consequence, only one black juror was
seated on the convicting jury. The Supreme Court of Massachu-
setts reversed the convictions, holding that the defendants had re-
butted the initial presumption of propriety in the exercise of pe-
remptory challenges. The test the court laid down closely
resembled that set forth in Wheeler: a party must show that "(1) a
pattern of conduct has developed whereby several prospective ju-
rors who have been challenged peremptorily are members of a dis-
crete group, and (2) there is a likelihood they are being excluded
from the jury solely by reason of their group membership."44 The
Soares test calls for the same burden-shifting procedure as in
Wheeler where a movant makes a prima facie showing,4" and pro-
vides the same start-over remedy if the challenger's reasons are
inadequate.4
Wheeler and Soares approached the basic conflict in axioms
from an entirely different perspective than Swain. Instead of at-
tempting to keep the axioms unadulterated and mutually exclu-
sive,47 the courts struck a balance by reducing the ideals to some-
what diluted versions. In other words, the courts qualified each
axiom: peremptory challenges are exempt from judicial inquiry un-
less they are based solely on race; racial discrimination is not per-
mitted unless it coincides with specific bias. This compromise pro-
vided a framework under which the two axioms could coexist.
48
One should note that Wheeler and Soares retained Swain's in-
itial presumption that parties exercise peremptory challenges in a
42. Counsel for the defense made a timely objection, and carefully laid the foundation
for an appeal. Id. at 473-74 n.8, 387 N.E.2d at 508-09 n.8.
43. The prosecutor used 44 of the 48 permissible peremptory challenges to remove 12 of
the 13 blacks in the jury pool and 32 of the 94 whites. Id. at 473, 387 N.E.2d at 508.
44. Id. at 490, 387 N.E.2d at 517.
45. Id. at 491, 387 N.E.2d at 517.
46. Id. at 490, 387 N.E.2d at 518. Judicial interpretation later broadened the remedy in
Massachusetts. See infra notes 157-60 and accompanying text.
47. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
48. The majority in Swain and the judges who have supported that decision seem to
have intuitively concluded that what is true in the abstract is true in reality, i.e., the two
cannot coexist. The assumption is that the entire worth of the peremptory challenge will be
lost if it is not absolutely peremptory. See Swain, 380 U.S. at 221-22 ("To subject the prose-
cutor's challenge in any particular case to the demands and traditional standards of the
Equal Protection Clause would entail a radical change in the nature and operation of the
challenge."). But experience has contradicted this assumption. See infra notes 135-39 and
accompanying text.
1985]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
constitutionally proper manner. Unlike Swain, however, they allow
a party to rebut that presumption by convincing the trial court
that there is a "reasonable inference 4 9 of improper use based on a
challenger's conduct in a specific case. This inference may be
drawn from surrounding circumstances:
[T]he party may show that his opponent has struck most or all
of the members of the identified group from the venire, or has
used a disproportionate number of his peremptories against the
group. He may also demonstrate that the jurors in question
share only this one characteristic-their membership in the
group-and that in all other respects they are as heterogeneous
as the community as a whole. Next, the showing may be supple-
mented when appropriate by such circumstances as failure of his
opponent to engage these same jurors in more than desultory
voir dire or indeed to ask them any questions at all. Lastly,...
the defendant need not be a member of the excluded group in
order to complain of a violation of the representative cross-sec-
tion rule; yet if he is, and especially if in addition his alleged
victim is a member of the group to which the majority of the
remaining jurors belong, these facts may also be called to the
court's attention.50
Whether the Wheeler-Soares balance is workable or even de-
sirable has been the subject of great controversy. 1 Several courts
have adopted or applied the Wheeler-Soares rationale; 52 others
49. Wheeler first requires the moving party to show a "strong likelihood" of improper
use of peremptory challenges, and then requires the trial court to find a "reasonable infer-
ence" of such improper use. 22 Cal. 3d at 280, 583 P.2d at 764, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 905, Soares
first requires a showing of only a "likelihood" of improper use, but requires the trial court to
make the same finding of a "reasonable inference." 377 Mass. at 499, 387 N.E.2d at 517. In
both jurisdictions, courts have held that the reasonable inference language controls. See
People v. Fuller, 136 Cal. App. 3d 403, 186 Cal. Rptr. 283 (Ct. App. 1982); Commonwealth v.
Walker, 379 Mass. 297, 397 N.E.2d 1105 (1979).
50. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 280-81, 583 P.2d at 764, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 905-06. The court
intended this list to be illustrative rather than exhaustive, and the Soares court appears to
have adopted it. See 377 Mass. at 490, 387 N.E.2d at 517.
51. See, e.g., Saltzburg & Powers, Peremptory Challenges and the Clash Between Im-
partiality and Group Representation, 41 MD. L. REv. 337 (1982); Younger, Unlawful Pe-
remptory Challenges, 7 LITIGATION 23 (1980); Note, Systematic Exclusion of Cognizable
Groups by Use of Peremptory Challenges, 11 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 927 (1982-83); Note, Peo-
ple v. Wheeler: Peremptory Challenges-A New Interpretation, 14 NEw ENG. L. REv. 370
(1978); Note, Peremptory Challenges and the Meaning of Jury Representation, 89 YAE
L.J. 1177 (1980); Comment, Deterring the Discriminatory Use of Peremptory Challenges,
21 AM. CRIM. L.J. 477 (1984); Comment, Survey of the Law of Peremptory Challenges: Un-
certainty in the Criminal Law, 44 U. Prr. L. REV. 673 (1983).
52. See McCray v. Abrams" 750 F.2d 1113 (2d Cir. 1984) (adopting the Wheeler-Soares
rationale based on the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution); People v.
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have expressly rejected it,53 preferring to adhere to Swain. Inter-
estingly, some intermediate appellate courts abandoned the Swain
test in favor of a single-case/rebuttable-presumption approach,
only to be reversed by their state's highest court."
C. The People v. Thompson Innovations
One of these intermediate appellate court decisions is note-
worthy because of its procedural innovation. In People v. Thomp-
son,55 the state tried and convicted a black defendant of grand lar-
ceny and possession of stolen property arising out of a car theft.
During jury selection, the prosecutor used all ten of his peremptory
challenges against black prospective jurors with the result that no
blacks sat on the jury. 6 Although the court substantially adopted
the Wheeler-Soares rationale, it "parted company" with the Cali-
fornia and Massachusetts courts in defining the circumstances suf-
ficient to rebut the initial presumption. Specifically, the Thompson
court rejected Wheeler and Soares:
to the extent that they suggest that a defendant may compel
inquiry into the reasons for a prosecutor's use of peremptory
challenges merely because the prosecutor has used a particular
number of his peremptory challenges to exclude black potential
jurors, for it may well be that the prosecutor's peremptory chal-
lenges were properly exercised, but for reasons that are not as
readily apparent to those who were not in the position of the
Judge who attended the voir dire.57
Thus, by making a total exclusion of blacks insufficient, by it-
Payne, 106 Il1. App. 3d 1034, 436 N.E.2d 1046 (App. Ct. 1982), rev'd, 99 Ill. 2d 135, 457
N.E.2d 1202 (1983) (applying the Wheeler-Soares rationale based on the sixth amendment
to the federal constitution); State v. Gilmore, 199 N.J. Super. 389, 489 A.2d 1175 (1985)
(adopting Wheeler-Soares based on the state constitution); State v. Crespin, 94 N.M. 486,
612 P.2d 716 (Ct. App. 1980) (adopting Wheeler-Soares test but finding it unmet); People v.
Thompson, 79 A.D.2d 87, 435 N.Y.S.2d 739 (App. Div. 1981) (adopting Wheeler-Soares test
with a procedural change, discussed infra p. 9).
53. See, e.g., State v. Wiley, - Ariz. -, 698 P.2d 1244 (1985); State v. Stewart, 225
Kan. 410, 591 P.2d 166 (1979); Commonwealth v. Henderson, 497 Pa. 23, 438 A.2d 951
(1981); State v. Grady, 93 Wis. 2d 1, 286 N.W.2d 607 (1979).
54. See People v. Payne, 99 Ill. 2d 135, 457 N.E.2d 1202 (1983), rev'd, 106 Ill. App. 3d
1034, 436 N.E.2d 1046 (1982); People v. McCray, 57 N.Y.2d 542, 443 N.E.2d 915, 457
N.Y.S.2d 441 (App. Ct. 1982) (choosing Swain test as the New York rule despite People v.
Thompson, 79 A.D.2d 87, 435 N.Y.S.2d 739 (App. Div. 1981)).
55. 79 A.D.2d 87, 435 N.Y.S.2d 739 (App. Div. 1981).
56. Despite some ambiguity in the record, it appeared that the prosecutor had exercised
an additional two peremptory challenges against blacks in selecting the alternate jurors. Id.
at 88 n.3, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 742 n.3.
57. Id. at 110-11, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 755.
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self, to warrant reversal of a trial court's determination not to
make inquiry,58 the Thompson court placed responsibility for im-
plementation largely within the discretion of the trial court.
The Thompson court further required a stronger finding on
the part of the trial court before a party could inquire into an op-
posing party's peremptory challenges. Whereas Wheeler and
Soares call for the trial court to find a "reasonable inference" 9 of
improper use, Thompson requires the trial court to find a "sub-
stantial likelihood" of improper use.6 0 This difference in degree
could certainly work against the moving party in marginal cases.
Taken together, the Thompson innovations created a new balance
of the conflicting axioms that lies somewhere between the require-
ments of Swain and those of Wheeler and Soares.61
D. The Supreme Court's Position
In 1983, the Supreme Court of the United States denied cer-
tiorari in McCray v. New York, 2 a case that would have given the
Court the opportunity to reconsider Swain. In doing so, however,
the Court gave rise to speculation that a reevaluation was in fact
taking place.68 Justice Marshall, in a strong dissent with which
Justice Brennan concurred, claimed that Swain "should be recon-
sidered in light of Sixth Amendment principles established by our
recent cases."' Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Blackmun and
Powell, concurred in the denial of certiorari, but only because of
the belief that "further consideration of the substantive and proce-
dural ramifications of the problem by other courts will enable us to
deal with the issue more wisely at a later date."65 While specifically
recognizing the importance of the underlying issue, Justice Stevens
invited the states to "serve as laboratories in which the issue re-
ceives further study before it is addressed by this Court."'66 Thus,
58. For a comparison with the Wheeler-Soares approach on this issue, see infra notes
140-48 and accompanying text.
59. See supra note 49.
60. Under Thompson, both the showing by the moving party and the finding by the
trial court must be a "substantial likelihood" of improper use of peremptory challenges. See
79 A.D.2d at 108, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 754.
61. Although Thompson, like Wheeler and Soares, allows the axioms to coexist through
compromise, see supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text, its procedure is clearly less in-
trusive into peremptory challenges.
62. 461 U.S. 961 (1983).
63. See The Supreme Court, 1982 Term, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 193-99 (1983).
64. McCray v. New York, 961 U.S. at 963-70.
65. Id. at 961-62.
66. Id. at 963.
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it appears that a majority of the Supreme Court would be amena-
ble to a reexamination of Swain. 7
III. A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
A. The Basis of an Appeal
Any reexamination of Swain must begin with an analysis of a
threshold issue: What is the basis of an appeal to reverse a convic-
tion due to allegedly discriminatory use of peremptory challenges?
There is clearly something morally wrong when no black person
sits on any jury in a particular county over a fifteen-year period."
The Supreme Court admitted as much in Swain." The problem
has been in finding and defining the constitutional wrong neces-
sary to reverse a conviction.7 0 Attempts by courts and commenta-
tors have resulted in a confused mass of internally inconsistent
justifications.
67. One commentator has noted that because of Justice Stevens's past postures in deni-
als of certiorari, "it seems unlikely that he would have written a concurrence that cast doubt
on Swain if he believed that the Swain rule would ultimately remain unchanged." The Su-
preme Court, 1982 Term, supra note 63, at 197.
68. Swain, 380 U.S. at 205.
69. By finding that a showing of continued use of peremptory challenges to achieve
exclusion of blacks over a period of time is sufficient to prove wrongful use, the Court im-
plicitly determined that such use is wrongful in the single case. The Court simply held that
such wrongful use could not be proven in the single case. See id. at 223-24; Comment, supra
note 26, at 1167-68.
70. Note that the object of reversing the conviction of a particular defendant is to pro-
tect the integrity of the Constitution. It is a means to deter wrongful use of peremptory
challenges and not a means to give the defendant a new trial in front of a more factually
impartial jury. The basic assumption in our system is that race is not a valid indicator of
juror impartiality. Therefore, an all-white jury composed of individuals who survive chal-
lenges for cause will be as factually impartial as a racially mixed jury composed of similar
individuals. To state it otherwise is to undermine the entire premise of prohibited racial
discrimination. Thus, constitutional impartiality must subsume more than simply factual
impartiality. See infra notes 86-92 and accompanying text.
71. See, e.g., United States v. Leslie, 759 F.2d 366 (5th Cir. 1985) (rehearing en banc
granted) (using supervisory power over the lower federal courts coupled with the United
States Attorney's obligation to adhere to the highest standards of fairness and justice); Peo-
ple v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978) (extending the cross-
section requirement from venires to petit juries); Jorgenson, Back to the Laboratory with
Peremptory Challenges: A Florida Response, 12 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 559 (1984) (extending
the cross-section requirement, but emphasizing the perceived community need for minority
participation on juries for the appearance of fairness); Younger, supra note 51 (using the
requirement of the MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIHILITY EC 7-13 (1979) that prose-
cutors seek justice, not just convictions); Note, The Defendant's Right to Object to
Prosecutorial Misuse of the Peremptory Challenge, 92 HARV. L. REv. 1770 (1979) (using the
principle that group affiliation alone does not determine an individual's ability to be an
impartial juror).
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Swain effectively foreclosed the use of the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. 72 Supreme Court decisions
following Swain shifted attention to the sixth amendment guaran-
tee of an impartial jury.73 In Taylor v. Louisiana,74 the Court
struck down, on sixth amendment grounds, state constitutional
and statutory provisions exempting women from jury duty who
had not specifically filed a written declaration of their desire to
serve. In striking these provisions, the Taylor court held that a
state may not systematically exclude distinctive groups from jury
pools because petit juries must be comprised of a "representative
cross-section of the community. 7 5 Focusing on the cross-section
requirement, Wheeler and Soares attempted to extend the require-
ment from jury pools to petit juries.
7 e
Although this extension to petit juries has a basic appeal (be-
cause the unchecked discriminatory use of peremptory challenges
can render the cross-section requirement meaningless), the reason-
ing behind it simply does not hold up under analysis. The func-
tions of the two phases77 of jury selection are fundamentally differ-
ent, precluding such an extension. The beginning phase, drawing
the venire, is necessary to have a manageable number of people
from which to draw the petit jury. Imposing the cross-section re-
quirement on venires, although bearing indirectly on impartiality,
primarily ensures widespread community participation on juries. 8
But at the final phase, petit jury selection, the focus shifts to ob-
taining jurors who will be impartial in a particular case. Cross-sec-
72. Swain v. Alabama conclusively established the heavy burden a defendant had to
meet under an equal protection analysis, and barring a direct overruling of Swain, any at-
tempt to reach a more reasonable result would have to rest on another provision of the
Constitution. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
73. Duncan v. Louisiana made the sixth amendment applicable to the states through
the fourteenth amendment. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
74. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
75. Id. at 528.
76. Both decisions were careful, of course, not to engage in the absurdity of requiring
particular juries to reflect a cross-section of the community. See Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 277,
583 P.2d at 762, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 903; Soares, 377 Mass. at 488, 387 N.E.2d at 516.
77. There are three phases of the jury selection process. The first is the initial compila-
tion of a list of prospective jurors. At the second phase, some of the prospective jurors are
disqualified, exempted, or excused on grounds of incompetency, undue hardship, and other
factors. The third phase entails questioning by the parties and the exercise of statutory
challenges-challenges for cause and peremptory challenges. See J. VAN DYKE, supra note
10, at 85-175. For purposes of this discussion, the first two stages are lumped together as
one, and the third stage is distinguished.
78. See Jury Selection and Service Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1869 (1982), Note, supra
note 71, at 1778-80.
[Vol. 39:777"
STATE v. NEIL
tionalism and impartiality are clearly not equivalent;"9 and, indeed,
they sometimes conflict within a given case.80
It is apparent that the cross-section requirement only furthers
factual impartiality of the jury through the venire stage. Recogniz-
ing this fact, some commentators have argued that if the jury is
not in fact partial, then no litigant has a right to complain regard-
less of systematic exclusion in the selection process.8 ' This result-
oriented argument is the constitutional equivalent of "the ends
justify the means." Proponents of this argument further claim that
the community has no right to complain either, because a black
person who is systematically excluded after the venire stage still
ultimately effects the makeup of the jury." . This, they allege, is
because the party that excluded him was forced to use one of a
limited number of peremptory challenges against him and, thus,
was unable to use that challenge to remove another prospective ju-
ror perceived to be unfavorable.83
The flaw in the foregoing argument appears upon returning to
Taylor and the way the courts applied it in Wheeler, Soares, and
Thompson. Commentators have focused on the test the court
adopted in Taylor (the representative cross-section requirement)
rather than on what the test was set up to identify and what the
holding precluded (systematic exclusion). The Wheeler and Soares
courts were merely mistaken in their emphasis.84 They were really
concerned about the systematic exclusion of distinct groups from
juries, and the level of factual impartiality of the post-exclusion
79. For example, on the facts of the Soares case, even though twelve out of thirteen
blacks were excluded, the composition of the jury (one out of twelve jurors, or 8.33 percent
was black) was fairly close to the composition of the venire (thirteen out of one hundred
seven veniremen, or 12.15 percent black). 377 Mass. 461, 387 N.E.2d 499 (1979). Thus, as-
suming the composition of the venire reflected a cross-section of the community, the defen-
dants in Soares had no reason to complain based on the cross-section test alone.
80. It is easy to visualize a jury pool containing several members of a racial group, none
of whom happen to be impartial in this case. In a jury pool containing a representative
number of blacks, all of whom have either read newspaper stories about the case, are related
to the defendant, or are friends of the victim of the crime, no impartial jury could contain a
black juror.
81. See, e.g., Saltzburg & Powers, supra note 53; Note, Peremptory Challenges and the
Meaning of Jury Representation, 89 YALE L.J. 1177 (1980).
82. See Brief for Respondent at 8 n.4, State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1984);
Saltzburg & Powers, supra note 51, at 357; Note, supra note 81, at 1192-93.
83. This argument places all prospective jurors on a continuum of bias, with the pur-
pose of peremptory challenges to eliminate the extremes on each end. Therefore, each pro-
spective juror who is challenged affects the composition of the jury by forcing a choice be-
tween him and the next least favorable juror to the party. See supra note 82.
84. Accord Younger, supra note 51, at 24; Note, supra note 71, at 1785-86.
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jury was irrelevant to them.85
The true basis for the Wheeler and Soares decisions is that
"constitutional impartiality" 86 requires more than factual or statis-
tical impartiality-it requires procedural integrity. Thus, a crimi-
nal defendant87 is entitled to a factually impartial jury chosen in a
constitutionally proper manner." That a constitutionally proper
manner, under the fourteenth amendment, precludes systematic
exclusion based on race has already been decided by the Supreme
Court in Swain."' State constitutional provisions,"0 statutory enact-
ments,91 and common sense mandate the same conclusion.92
The reason that systematic exclusion based on race is uncon-
stitutional is not merely that race is not a true indicator of a ju-
ror's impartiality. 3 Many proxies that litigants choose are not true
indicators of juror qualification;9" it is the essence of the peremp-
tory challenge that a litigant may exercise it on perceived partial-
ity regardless of whether that perception is correct.'5 If the litigant
is incorrect, he wastes one of his limited peremptory challenges,
85. Both decisions held systematic exclusion to be prejudicial per se-the error could
not be harmless. See Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 283, 583 P.2d at 766, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 907;
Soares, 377 Mass. at 492, 387 N.E.2d at 518.
86. This reference is to a true guarantee to an impartial jury in the federal or any state
constitution.
87. Article I, § 16 of the Florida Constitution and the sixth amendment to the United
States Constitution apply only to criminal cases. Nevertheless, a persuasive argument can
be made that civil litigants are also entitled to a constitutionally impartial jury. Even
though neither article I, § 22 of the Florida Constitution nor the seventh amendment to the
federal constitution mention the word impartial, courts have held "anything less than an
impartial jury is the functional equivalent of no jury at all." City of Miami v. Cornett, 463
So. 2d 399, 402 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); see also Holley v. J & S Sweeping Co., 143 Cal. App. 3d
588, 192 Cal. Rptr. 74 (Ct. App. 1983) (holding that failure to require explanation of basis
for challenge where prima facie showing is made constitutes reversible error).
88. The federal and state constitutions are process-oriented, not result-oriented; in con-
stitutional questions, the end cannot justify the means. See supra note 81.
89. See supra note 69.
90. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2 (equal protection).
91. A "constitutionally proper manner" means in accordance with the Constitution and
the laws passed under that Constitution. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 243 (1982) (providing: "No
citizen possessing all other qualifications which are or may be prescribed by law shall be
disqualified for service as grand or petit juror in any court of the United States, or of any
State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude . ); cf. Peters v. Kiff,
407 U.S. 493, 505 (1972) (White, J., concurring).
92. "[J]ustice must satisfy the appearance of justice." In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133,
136 (1955) (quoting Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954)). Ironically, this passage
is quoted in Swain. 380 U.S. at 219.
93. Cf. Note, supra note 71, at 1781.
94. Dress, mannerisms, and occupation are common examples. See J. VAN DYKE, supra
note 10, at 146.
95. See supra note 10.
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and he must pay the price in the form of opportunity cost. None-
theless, race as a proxy is different in kind, rather than degree,
from proxies such as style of dress. It is an insidious, pervasive,
self-perpetuating proxy that is intolerable in our democratic soci-
ety." A peremptory challenge wasted by reason of a racial proxy
hurts more than the litigant who wasted it-society suffers for it.9
7
Therefore, a litigant does not have an unfettered right to utilize
proxies that are constitutionally impermissible.
Analytically, this discussion focuses upon two separate distinc-
tions. First, there is the difference, and occasionally the conflict,
between cross-sectionalism and impartiality. Second, there is the
distinction between factual impartiality and constitutional impar-
tiality, the latter including both factual impartiality and proce-
dural integrity. From these distinctions, it is apparent that the
cross-section test by itself is inadequate as a decision-making tool
beyond the venire stage of jury selection. Also, because jurors who
survive challenges for cause are considered to be factually impar-
tial,98 tests bearing on this element are not helpful. Thus, focus
necessarily shifts to the procedural integrity element of constitu-
tional impartiality. In other words, constitutional guarantees to an
impartial jury require us to look at the manner in which litigants
choose the petit jury.
At this point in the analysis, the conclusions proceed by their
own weight. To the extent that this constitutional requirement
96. One of the values that sets our society apart from others is the respect for the
integrity of the individual and his right to be judged for what he is. Nothing is so destruc-
tive of that value as proxies based on factors such as race. Some studies have purported to
show that certain groups, including blacks, are statistically more likely to vote against the
state in a criminal trial. If this is a justification for systematically excluding blacks, and if
the statistics reflect a basic mistrust of a system in which blacks feel they have little say, it
seems that we have created a vicious circle, a self-fulfilling prophecy. The worst part is that,
even though a real opportunity cost exists, the system cannot work like a market, with par-
ticipants minimizing opportunity costs for themselves. For fifteen years, nobody in Tal-
ladega County, Alabama, realized or cared to realize that they were incurring opportunity
costs.
97. The profound societal effects of real and perceived racial discrimination in the
Miami area, where this case arose, are persuasively set forth in the text and appendix to the
Brief of Amici Curiae, State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1984). See also Jorgenson, supra
note 71, at 579-80.
98. The states and the federal government have set standards by statute that allow
prospective jurors to be dismissed for cause. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 913.03 (1984). Because
peremptory challenges are not constitutionally required and could, therefore, be eliminated
altogether, these statutory standards essentially define impartiality. Therefore, impartiality
does not mean complete absence of bias. It would be impossible for any human being who
brings with him all of his life's experiences to be absolutely neutral to every issue in a given
case.
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conflicts with the traditional inviolability of peremptory chal-
lenges, the latter must yield. Constitutional guarantees to an im-
partial jury, whether state or federal, mandate the repudiation of
Swain.
B. The Proper Balance
The foregoing analysis would appear to resolve the conflict in
axioms unequivocally against peremptory challenges. But the axi-
oms do not exist in a vacuum, and doctrinal conclusions are not
self-executing. To this point, we have assumed a perfect world
where it is possible to know the motivating factor behind a given
peremptory challenge. Of course, that is not the case at all; the
crucial question is one of state of mind. Problems naturally inhere
in a constitutional mandate to forbid the exercise of a highly val-
ued,9e lawful right where wrongful intent motivates such an exer-
cise. Therefore, we must consider a third major factor.
This third consideration is the administration of justice. Con-
stitutional requirements in the use of peremptory challenges may
impose certain burdens on the administration of justice, including
uncertainty and inefficiency, 100 nonfinality of trial court determina-
tions,' 0e overuse of appellate judicial resources,0 2 and a possible
flood of frivolous litigation. 03 In attempting to deal with these bur-
dens, we must give consideration to the workability of the initial
99. Indeed the peremptory challenge has long been regarded as "one of the most impor-
tant of the rights secured to the accused." Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 408
(1894), quoted in Swain, 380 U.S. at 219. As Blackstone noted two centuries ago, peremp-
tory challenges serve at least two valuable functions: first, they allow a party to remove
prospective jurors he feels, but cannot prove to the court, are prejudiced against him, and
second, they allow a party to remove prospective jurors he may have alienated through
probing voir dire questioning. See 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENrARIES* 353. Today, peremp-
tory challenges are seen as a means to achieve an impartial jury (when used correctly) by
eliminating both extremes of partial prospective jurors. See Swain, 380 U.S. at 219.
100. When trial courts are uncertain how to apply rules, they are forced to make ad hoe
determinations. This in turn results in uncertainty for litigants planning trial tactics. To the
extent that parties and trial judges have incentives to test or argue over the interpretations
of rules, inefficiency results.
101. If trial court determinations are not perceived as the final word on particular is-
sues, especially preliminary ones like jury selection, the process of conducting trials would
become longer and more costly to both parties.
102. Appellate judicial resources are limited and already overburdened. Improvidently
created appealable issues are not in the interest of judicial economy.
103. In a racially diverse community, it is foreseeable that this may be an appealable
issue that is almost always available. If the standard used by the courts does not distinguish




evidentiary requirement, the efficacy of the sanction imposed, and
the practicality of the standard on review of the initial determina-
tion. In addition, it would be improper to over-deter the use of
peremptory challenges. 104 Thus, even after resolving the theoretical
conflict in axioms, we are faced with a tough balancing problem.
The question becomes: To what extent are we willing to disrupt
the administration of justice and the sanctity of peremptory chal-
lenges in order to root out racial discrimination?
Qualitatively, the answer to this question is relatively easy. We
should seek a resolution that maximizes benefits in terms of re-
duced racial discrimination without incurring excessive marginal
costs in terms of the other considerations. It is possible to be some-
what more specific without engendering excessive disagreement.
We need to strive for a procedure 105 that promotes low cost correc-
tion of discriminatory challenges early in the process (i.e., at the
trial court level), provides relative certainty and finality of trial
court determinations, allows for limited appellate review, and still
preserves the integrity of the peremptory challenge. Such a solu-
tion requires that determination of the issue be largely committed
to the discretion of the trial judge, tempered by a presumption
that parties will act in a constitutional manner.
Even if most people would agree on this qualitative solution, 0 6
the debate remains over how to practically implement it to achieve
the desired results. Because the courts can only implement the res-
olution in conflicting axioms through a judicial procedure, the de-
velopment of such a procedure becomes the crucial issue. Because
the workability of a procedure is difficult, if not impossible, to pre-
dict in advance, empirical evidence is invaluable to that develop-
ment. This, apparently, is the current posture of the Supreme
Court.10 7 While the Court seems to have decided that peremptory
challenges must yield to racial equality in the context of jury selec-
tion,10 it is waiting until states compile enough empirical evidence
104. As noted above, peremptory challenges serve a very valuable purpose in our sys-
tem of justice through trial by jury. See supra note 99.
105. The use of the word procedure here, referring to the judicial method of determin-
ing misuses of peremptory challenges, is not to be confused with the earlier use of that word
in connection with the phrase "procedural integrity," which refers to the process of petit
jury selection.
106. Even in these general terms, this solution presupposes several value-laden policy
choices. Among others, it assumes that there are other societal goals of equal or more impor-
tance than deterrence of racial discrimination. Therefore, it is not to be expected that every-
one will agree.
107. See supra Part II D p. 786.
108. Whether the Court decides to directly overrule Swain or repudiate it on sixth
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to justify adoption of a procedure with predictable results. The
Court's approach is sensible because the procedure it adopts will
define, in a very practical sense, the substantive constitutional
rights of litigants.
IV. THE Neil DECISION
Florida is the first state0 9 to accept the Supreme Court's tacit
invitation in McCray to experiment with alternatives to Swain.110
Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Florida acceded to the wishes
of Justice Stevens's concurrence by fashioning a new procedure in
State v. Neil, rather than simply importing that of Wheeler-
Soares. But Neil is not an intricate, independently reasoned opin-
ion; the Neil court relies heavily on Wheeler, Soares, and Thomp-
son, and reaches its holding essentially through a smorgasbord
technique."1 The significance of the decision, therefore, lies in the
procedure the court actually adopted, particularly those areas of
the procedure that differ from Wheeler and Soares.
The Neil court succinctly identified what it considered to be
the basis of a claim of allegedly discriminatory use of peremptory
challenges:
Article I, section 16 of the Florida Constitution guarantees the
right to an impartial jury. The right to peremptory challenges is
not of constitutional dimension. The primary purpose of pe-
remptory challenges is to aid and assist in the selection of an
impartial jury. It was not intended that such challenges be used
solely as a scalpel to excise a distinct racial group from a repre-
sentative cross-section of society. It was not intended that such
challenges be used to encroach upon the Constitutional guaran-
amendment or other grounds, procedural implementation will be the crucial issue.
109. Pointing to language in the Stevens concurrence to the effect that "Itihere is pres-
ently no conflict of decision within the federal system," the federal district court hearing
McCray's petition for habeas corpus adopted the Wheeler-Soares rationale and ordered that
McCray be retried. See McCray v. Abrams, 576 F. Supp. 1244, 1246 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (quot-
ing 461 U.S. at 962). On appeal to the Second Circuit, the state joined McCray in urging
that Swain be repudiated, but differed on the procedure advocated. The court affirmed the
district court's repudiation of Swain on sixth amendment grounds, but reversed because the
lower court should have allowed the state a hearing to attempt to overcome McCray's prima
facie case. 457 So. 2d at 483-84; see McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113 (2d Cir. 1984).
110. Because the Supreme Court of Florida in Neil mentioned the McCray concurrence
and dissent, it appears that this invitation may in fact have provided some impetus to repu-
diate Swain, especially in light of the four-to-three split on the court.
111. After summarizing Wheeler, Soares, and Thompson, the court simply chose the
elements from each decision, adding little of its own analysis. See 457 So. 2d at 486-87.
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tee of an impartial jury.1 12
The court rested its decision entirely on the Florida Constitution
and specifically avoided federal constitutional issues.'" The court
went on to find that "adhering to the Swain test of evaluating pe-
remptory challenges impedes, rather than furthers, article I, sec-
tion 16's guarantee,""" and held that "the test set out in Swain is
no longer to be used by this state's courts when confronted with
the allegedly discriminatory use of peremptory challenges."''
In devising the test to be used in such a situation, the court
borrowed substantially from Thompson. The initial presumption is
that parties will properly exercise peremptory challenges. To rebut
this presumption, a party must make a timely objection and
demonstrate on the record a "strong likelihood" that particular
persons have been challenged solely because of their membership
in a distinct racial group.11 The trial court must then decide
whether the party's showing is sufficient using Thompson's "sub-
stantial likelihood" standard. In applying this standard, the su-
preme court afforded the trial court abundant discretion in defer-
ence to its superior position from which to observe and evaluate.
As in Thompson, the exclusion of a number of blacks, by itself, is
insufficient to require an inquiry, and if the trial court does not
find a substantial likelihood of impropriety, it will make no such
inquiry. If, however, the court determines that a moving party's
showing is sufficient, the burden shifts to the other party to show
that he did not exercise the questioned challenges solely because of
race. If, in answer to the court's inquiry, the party cannot demon-
strate that his challenges were "based on the particular case on
trial, the parties or witnesses, or characteristics of the challenged
persons other than race,"1 7 the court will deem him to have acted
improperly. The remedy in such a case is to strike the entire jury
pool and begin voir dire again with a new pool.
Note that in fashioning this test, the Supreme Court of Flor-
ida imported both of Thompson's innovations.118 This is especially
112. Id. at 486.
113. See id. at 487 n.12; cf. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
114. 457 So. 2d at 486.
115. Id.
116. Neil is limited in scope to the use of peremptory challenges on the basis of race,
with extension to other groups expressly left open. See infra notes 174-75 and accompany-
ing text.
117. 457 So. 2d at 487. As under Wheeler-Soares, the party making the challenge need
not give reasons equivalent to those required for a challenge for cause.
118. See supra Part II C p. 785.
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significant in light of McCray because Florida is the only jurisdic-
tion that has repudiated Swain and has incorporated refinements
of the Wheeler-Soares procedure. 119 But the court's deliberate
choice to refine the test shows more than a desire to experiment. It
also reflects a different view of what the court meant the test to
accomplish.120
The court went on to hold that this new test applied to both
the prosecution and the defense.12 1 The court accompanied its
holding with a one-sentence justification: "The state, no less than a
defendant, is entitled to an impartial jury.'1 22 Under this author's
analysis, the state is thus entitled to a jury chosen in a constitu-
tionally proper manner. Because jury selection in criminalproceed-
ings is "state action" with respect to the general public,'123 the ac-
tions of the defendant are within the ambit of the rule.' 24 In any
case, the holding makes good practical sense because a single stan-
dard, applicable to all parties, is necessary to achieve a workable
system with desired results.
25
The Supreme Court of Florida went on to narrow its decision.
The court restricted application of the case to peremptory chal-
119. Although Thompson was never reversed, the New York Court of Appeals implic-
itly rejected it in People v. McCray, 57 N.Y.2d 542, 443 N.E.2d 915, 457 N.Y.S.2d 441
(1982).
120. See infra note 134 and accompanying text.
121. See 457 So. 2d at 487. This holding takes on added meaning because in the instant
case Neil himself challenged white prospective jurors solely on the basis of race, attempting
to reach the remaining black in the jury pool. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
122. 457 So. 2d at 487. Clearly, the state does have an interest in the composition of the
jury. The defendant cannot waive a jury trial without the consent of the state. See FLA. R.
CRIM. P. 3.260. Further, the rule specifically allows peremptory challenges, and in the case
where the state tries defendants jointly, the rule allows the state the aggregate number of
peremptory challenges given to the defendants. See FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.350. An appellate
court has also interpreted this statement in Neil to mean that the constitutional right to a
jury is the right to an impartial jury. See City of Miami v. Cornett, 463 So. 2d 399 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1985).
123. Cf. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980) (actions of privately retained defense
counsel amounted to state action); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (private "pre-pri-
mary" elections are a public function and are,.therefore, state action); Shelly v. Kraemer,
334 U.S. 1 (1948) (state court enforcing a private agreement amounts to state action).
124. This argument may be extended to apply even in civil trials. The state provides a
forum for the resolution of private disputes partly because it provides a means for enforcing
its public policy. When litigants use the civil courts and select juries, they are acting as state
actors with respect to the rest of the community. In these circumstances, it would be consti-
tutionally improper for a litigant to systematically exclude blacks.
125. Much of the concern, at least in the Miami area, has been directed toward defen-
dants' abuses of peremptory challenges. Three cases in particular have held the public eye,
all of which involved white police officers acquitted by all-white juries of beating or shooting
blacks to death. See Brief of Amici Curiae at 8-11, State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1984).
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lenges based on race126 and held its decision to be nonretroac-
tive. 27 Then, after noting the cross-section requirement for jury
venires in Taylor v. Louisiana, the court admonished:
No one is entitled to a jury of any particular composition, and it
is possible that the cross-section requirement might have to give
way before article I, section 16's guarantee of an impartial jury
... . It may even be possible that, on the peculiar facts of a
particular case, no member of some distinct group could be im-
partial. If this occurs, an attorney should be able to state with
certainty that this is so and that peremptories have been exer-
cised because of empathy or bias."'
The scope of the Neil opinion depends in large part on how
this passage is interpreted. If instances where "no member of some
distinct group could be impartial" include most cases involving ra-
cially sensitive issues, the exception will have swallowed the rule,
and Neil will mean little. If those cases encompass only extraordi-
nary fact patterns, as they should and probably will,12 9 it is a valid
exception that will leave the rule essentially intact. Although the
Wheeler and Soares courts would probably have reached the same
conclusion on this exception,5 0 Neil is the first opinion to suggest
overtly that such cases might exist.
Although the Neil decision lacks a thorough analysis, its hold-
ing and reasoning are consistent with this author's analysis. The
court rested its decision on the constitutional guarantee of an im-
partial jury, and clearly focused on the procedural integrity aspect
of constitutional impartiality. The court also distinguished be-
tween cross-sectionalism and impartiality. In essence, Neil holds
that mere absence or legitimate exclusion' 31 of a racial group from
a particular jury is not wrong-only systematic exclusion is consti-
tutionally impermissible. The exception in Neil states that in
unique circumstances the court will permit systematic exclusion,
but only when the proxy of race is a correct indicator of juror qual-
ification."3 2 Establishing that race is a correct proxy in a given case
126. See 457 So. 2d at 487. ("The applicability to other groups will be left open and will
be determined as such cases arise."); see infra notes 174-75 and accompanying text.
127. 457 So. 2d at 488. This part of the holding has already been somewhat modified.
See infra note 164 and accompanying text.
128. 457 So. 2d at 487 (citation and footnotes omitted).
129. See infra note 176 and accompanying text.
130. In such a situation, group bias would coincide with specific bias.
131. This reference is to challenges for cause and to the proper exercise of peremptory
challenges.
132. Compare this characterization with the compromised axioms in Wheeler and
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will probably require a showing that approaches the level of a chal-
lenge for cause, considering the Neil court's statement that "an at-
torney should be able to state with certainty that this is so."' ss
The Neil court also implicitly balanced conflicting interests. In
substantially following Thompson, the court opined that that deci-
sion "charts a more even course' ' 3 4 than either Wheeler or Soares.
The main difference in the Thompson procedure is that its appli-
cation is more restricted at both the trial and appellate court
levels. Thus, the Supreme Court of Florida made a statement of
policy: Florida is not willing to disrupt the administration of jus-
tice in its courts as much as California and Massachusetts are for
the purpose of discouraging racial discrimination. This statement
could represent one of two views: (1) Florida is generally less con-
cerned with discouraging racial discrimination than are California
and Massachusetts or, more likely, (2) Florida has benefitted from
California's and Massachusetts's experience and has determined
that the marginal benefit in terms of racial equality does not jus-
tify the marginal cost in terms of burdens on the administration of
justice.
V. A PRACTICAL ANALYSIS
A. A Comparative Commentary on Wheeler, Soares and Neil
In order to predict the practical effect of the Neil decision, it
is necessary for comparison purposes to review the California and
Massachusetts experiences after Wheeler and Soares. No commen-
tator has yet undertaken an empirical analysis of either state's ex-
perience; still, one may glean some general impressions from the
case law and literature. First, deterrence of racial discrimination
has proven quite satisfactory.3"5 Second, the feared problems from
the theoretical conflict in axioms' have apparently not material-
ized. That is, allowing limited, discretionary inquiry into particular
questioned challenges has not profoundly changed the peremptory
Soares. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
133. 457 So. 2d at 487. This language tends to indicate that the trial court will then
decide the issue.
134. Id. at 485.
135. Justice Mosk of the Supreme Court of California, author of the Wheeler opinion,
has reported that racial discrimination in California courtrooms has almost disappeared. See
Mosk, Jury Selection: One State's Racial Bias Remedy, N.Y. Times, June 24, 1983, at A24,
col. 3.
136. See supra notes 10-14 and accompanying text.
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challenge system.137 Third, although the Wheeler and Soares deci-
sions have required some further appellate adjudication to clarify
the standards laid down,138 there has not been an inordinate
amount of appellate review. 3 9
Yet, before we too readily accept the desirability of Wheeler
and Soares, we should remember the nature of what they cor-
rected. We cannot realistically hope to eliminate racial prejudice
within our justice system, or even significantly change bigoted
views by law. At most, a sound, well-applied procedure can restrict
overt manifestations of those views. The more intricate the proce-
dure in terms of opportunity for judicial intervention and availa-
bility of appeals, the more effective it will be. But at some point,
137. This is not to say that the peremptory challenge system has not been changed at
all. But, on the whole, the changes have not been fundamental. See People v. Hall, 35 Cal.
3d 161, 170, 672 P.2d 854, 859-60, 197 Cal. Rptr. 71, 77 (1983). Explaining particular chal-
lenges is not nearly as burdensome or destructive to peremptory challenges as some courts
make it out to be. The Dade County State Attorney has voluntarily adopted the policy of
explaining peremptory challenges in any case where the trial court perceives improper use,
and apparently the system works well. See Brief of Amici Curiae at 10 n.3, State v. Neil, 457
So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1984). In addition, New York State has taken the position that during the
two-year period between Thompson and McCray, the Thompson rule did not create any
practical problems whatsoever. McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113, 1132-33 (2d Cir. 1984).
138. In late 1983, the Supreme Court of California noted that there had been but three
published court of appeals opinions since the Wheeler decision in 1978. See People v. Hall,
35 Cal. 3d 161, 169-70, 672 P.2d 854, 859, 197 Cal. Rptr. 71, 76-77 (1983). Since that time,
there have been five published appellate court reviews of post-Wheeler trials where the
Wheeler issue was a major one. See People v. Alexander, 159 Cal. App. 3d 75, 205 Cal. Rptr.
387 (Ct. App. 1984) (clarifying standard on review); People v. Walker, 157 Cal. App. 3d
1060, 205 Cal. Rptr. 278 (Ct. App. 1984) (affirming the trial court and applying Wheeler);
People v. Superior Court, 157 Cal. App. 3d 55, 203 Cal. Rptr. 519 (Ct. App. 1984) (clarifying
the Wheeler remedy); People v. Ortega, 156 Cal. App. 3d 63, 202 Cal. Rptr. 657 (Ct. App.
1984) (clarifying the timing allowed for making a Wheeler motion); People v. Clay, 153 Cal.
App. 3d 433, 200 Cal. Rptr. 269 (Ct. App. 1984) (affirming the trial court and distinguishing
Hall).
In Massachusetts, appellate courts have reviewed the issues raised in Soares on six oc-
casions where the trial court had the benefit of the Soares decision and where the issue was
comparatively serious. See Commonwealth v. Wood, 389 Mass. 552, 451 N.E.2d 714 (1983)
(defining cognizable groups to exclude age); Commonwealth v. Reid, 384 Mass. 247, 424
N.E.2d 495 (1981) (defining the Soares remedy); Commonwealth v. Thomas, 19 Mass. App.
Ct. 1, 471 N.E.2d 376 (1984) (affirming the trial court based on adequate explanations);
Commonwealth v. Joyce, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 417, 467 N.E.2d 214 (1984) (clarifying the trial
court's permissible role); Commonwealth v. Perry, 15 Mass. App. Ct. 932, 444 N.E.2d 1298
(1983) (affirming the trial court's refusal to accept explanations); Commonwealth v. Di Mat-
teo, 12 Mass. App. Ct. 547, 427 N.E.2d 754 (1981) (affirming the trial court and clarifying
the extent of its discretion).
139. Compare the amount of appellate review required by the Wheeler and Soares de-
cisions with that required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (pertaining to fifth
amendment right against self-incrimination and sixth amendment right to counsel); Interna-
tional Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (pertaining to fourteenth amendment
due process requirements for personal jurisdiction); Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
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the marginal costs of administering the procedure necessarily will
exceed the marginal benefits of deterred racial discrimination. Lo-
cating that point in practice, and even in theory, is not easy. Nev-
ertheless, the Wheeler-Soares solution lies somewhere past that
point.
A concrete example illustrates one of the major differences be-
tween Neil and Wheeler-Soares. In Holley v. J & S Sweeping
Co.,140 the defendant in a civil negligence action 141 used three of its
six peremptory challenges to excuse three of four black prospective
jurors. 142 Either the court or the plaintiff, who was black, ques-
tioned all three of the jurors, but the defendant questioned none of
them. After the defendant removed the third prospective juror, the
plaintiff complained about what he perceived to be the defendant's
attempt to systematically exclude blacks from the jury. After argu-
ment, the trial judge specifically found that there was no "exclu-
sion by race' 43 and refused to inquire into the defendant's rea-
sons. The defendant used its remaining three peremptory
challenges to remove white prospective jurors, but only after exten-
sive questioning by the defendant or after unsuccessful challenge
for cause. The all-white jury returned a special verdict for the de-
fendant on the issue of liability.
Wheeler and Soares authorize reversal of the trial court's de-
termination not to inquire into a party's peremptory challenges
based solely on the statistically disproportionate removal of mem-
bers of particular racial groups.144 Indeed, that is precisely what
the California appellate court did in the Holley case. 45 In contrast,
Neil allows reversal of the trial court's determination only upon a
140. 143 Cal. App. 3d 588, 192 Cal. Rptr. 74 (1983).
141. The court in Holley extended the Wheeler rule to civil cases. Id. at 592, 192 Cal.
Rptr. at 77. A Florida appellate court made a similar extension of Neil. See City of Miami v.
Cornett, 463 So. 2d 399 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985). Massachusetts courts have also strongly sug-
gested that the Soares rule applies in civil cases. See Rosenthal v. Weckstein, 19 Mass. App.
Ct. 944, 473 N.E.2d 202 (1985); Terrio v. McDonough, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 163, 450 N.E.2d
190, rev. denied, 453 N.E.2d 1231 (Mass. 1983).
142. The court excused the fourth black prospective juror. See 143 Cal. App. 3d at 590,
192 Cal. Rptr. at 75.
143. Id. at 590, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 76.
144. Wheeler places the burden on the moving party to make out a prima facie case
and to show a reasonable inference of improper use. The opinion goes on to state that "the
party may show that his opponent has ...used a disproportionate number of his pe-
remptories against the group." See 22 Cal. 3d at 280, 583 P.2d at 764, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 905.
Soares, although not phrased in terms of a prima facie case, specifically states that "[tlhe
disproportionate exclusion by the prosecution . . . sufficiently indicated the likelihood that
blacks were being challenged because they were black." 377 Mass. at 490, 387 N.E.2d at 517.
145. See 143 Cal. App. 3d at 280, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 78.
[Vol. 39:777
STATE v. NEIL
finding of abuse of discretion. 4" A party may not inquire into the
reason for a peremptory challenge unless the trial court finds that
there is a "substantial likelihood" of the party's improper use of
the challenge. 147 A finding on the record that, in a Florida court's
opinion, the party properly exercised his peremptory challenges ef-
fectively insulates the case from reversal on this issue in all but the
most flagrant of abuses. Under Neil, a Florida court would have
affirmed the lower court's judgment in Holley.14
The Neil approach makes eminently more sense in such a situ-
ation. There is little, if any, benefit in substituting the opinion of
several appellate judges based on a cold record for the determina-
tion of a trial judge who actually witnessed the process. On the
other hand, the costs of such a practice are great. Expansive appel-
late review forces trial courts either to require an explanation for
peremptory challenges that they may believe are valid, or to leave
the door open for reversal. Such a rule derogates the competence
of trial judges, needlessly erodes the integrity of peremptory chal-
lenges, and unnecessarily burdens the administration of justice.
The increased latitude given a trial judge in deciding whether
to inquire into a party's challenges is the biggest textually sup-
ported difference between the Neil and Wheeler-Soares ap-
proaches. But, in addition, Neil reads very differently from
Wheeler and Soares; it is not the same type of expansive, ground-
breaking, remedial decision, intent on combatting a perceived evil
at any cost. A sense of intentional circumspection pervades the
opinion.149 Although it is difficult to discern from case law, 50 one
146. Neil explicitly states: "If the court finds no such likelihood, no inquiry may be
made of the person exercising the questioned peremptories." 457 So. 2d at 486. The court
later added in a footnote: "We emphasize that the trial court's decision as to whether or not
an inquiry is needed is largely a matter of discretion." Id. at 487 n.10.
147. The difference between the required showing of a "strong likelihood" and a finding
by the trial court of a "substantial likelihood" will probably be of little importance. Just as
California and Massachusetts have held the required finding of a reasonable inference to
control, so too will the substantial likelihood standard probably prevail. See supra note 49.
But because the trial court is given so much discretion, the difference is purely semantic.
148. Application of Neil so far appears to support this conclusion. See infra notes 165-
69 and accompanying text.
149. Note the following features of the Neil opinion: the finding required by the trial
court is a tougher standard than that in Wheeler or Soares; the trial court has wide discre-
tion as to whether to inquire into a party's peremptory challenge; there is an explicit excep-
tion to the general rule set out in the opinion; the decision applies only to racial discrimina-
tion; and the decision is declared to be nonretroactive.
150. Because courts have an interest in protecting their decisions, the appellate court
versions of the facts on this issue are of little help. Unlike a difference in the rule, which can
be demonstrated in a concrete way through the facts of a particular case as with Holley,
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can reasonably expect that in view of this difference in attitude,
appellate courts in Florida will reverse less often on the same set of
facts than will California and Massachusetts courts. This will be so
where the trial court has inquired and accepted a party's answer,
as well as where the court has made no inquiry.
Accepting this latter observation as true, it appears that the
Supreme Court of Florida intended to allow one strike at racially
discriminatory peremptory challenges in the vast majority of cases.
This one strike, at the trial court level, is a low-cost 51 improve-
ment in equality calculated to have extremely beneficial results. 15 2
In other words, the primary goal of Neil's innovation is to provide
for correction of the parties' misuse of peremptory challenges. Neil
does not evidence a willingness to review, in the great run of cases,
the trial court's supervision of the parties' peremptory chal-
lenges. " ' At some point it ceases to be worthwhile to supervise the
supervisor; the Neil court concludes that the trial court level is an
appropriate stopping point.
A graphic representation may help to illustrate and contrast
supra, this difference in attitude is much more difficult to show. See supra note 140 and
accompanying text.
151. The Neil one-strike procedure is extremely low cost deterrence, because most of
the deterrent effect comes from the fact that the trial court can do something about misuse
of peremptory challenges. Dealing with motions on the issue and making inquiry into a
party's use of peremptory challenges is simple, every-day business for a court. The only part
of the Neil procedure that significantly changes time or financial cost is when the court
finds it necessary to strike the jury pool and begin voir dire again. Yet, the court will only
infrequently need to invoke this sanction.
152. Before Neil, a bigoted party disposed to misuse peremptory challenges could do so.
Now, Neil also requires the concurrence of a bigoted judge disposed to disregard his duty. If
we arbitrarily assume that twenty percent of the population is both bigoted and disposed to
misuse or allow misuse of peremptory challenges, Neil cuts successful discrimination from
twenty percent to four percent in one swipe.
153. Trial judges may be more or less sensitive to stopping racial discrimination based
on their personal views. But it would be a mistake to assume that even bigoted judges
would, as a matter of course, let their own prejudices override their sworn duties.
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the approaches.'" Picture as "the whole" the aggregate power to
decide who may be peremptorily challenged. Under Swain, the
parties have absolute discretion in a given case; therefore, all uses
of discretion are by definition legitimate, and "the whole" resides
in the parties. In the alternatives to Swain, "the whole" is divided
into three parts. The greatest part resides in the litigant, the next
largest part in the trial court,'" and the smallest part in the appel-
late court.'" The difference between the Wheeler-Soares approach
and that of Neil relates to the proportional divisions of the whole.
Under Neil, the court wrested less discretion from the parties to be
placed in the hands of the courts; and of the discretion given to the
courts, a much smaller proportion is allocated to the appellate
courts.
This characterization of the Neil decision makes it clear that
Florida will not follow some of the recent case law developments in
Massachusetts. In 1981, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts recognized the authority of trial courts to fashion
remedies other than that explicitly defined in Soares. 57 Specifi-
cally, the court ratified the trial court's disallowance of a party's









TC = trial court
AC = appellate court
155. This part represents the trial court's discretion in overseeing the use of peremp-
tory challenges.
156. This part represents appellate court review of the trial court's use of discretion.
157. See Commonwealth v. Reid, 384 Mass. 247, 424 N.E.2d 495 (1981).
158. Although Soares imported verbatim the Wheeler language that the court "must
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intrude into peremptory challenges is antithetical to the Neil ra-
tionale. In Massachusetts, where this practice has become com-
monplace,159 trial courts assume an adversarial stance rather than
remaining neutral. By passing judgment on whether to allow each
peremptory challenge, the court has more authority to regulate the
composition of the jury than the parties. Neil does not sanction
such an intrusion into the parties' peremptory challenges."6 '
In addition, some Massachusetts trial courts are making in-
quiries into uses of peremptory challenges on their own initia-
tive. '6 The Neil opinion did not contemplate that trial courts
would raise the issue sua sponte, but it did not specifically prohibit
them from doing so. Nevertheless, if the basis of any objection
stems from a right to an impartial jury, that right belongs to the
parties in the action and, like other rights, it can be waived."6 2 A
trial court should not exercise its power to indiscriminately right
every wrong it perceives. Florida, under Neil, is not likely to per-
mit its trial courts to assume such an adversary-like role.
B. A Forecast of Practical Workability
In practice, Florida attorneys will probably begin noting the
race of each prospective juror during voir dire as a matter of
course, at least in those cases where it may become an issue. Until
Florida develops definitive case law, attorneys will no doubt probe
the limits of the Neil rule. Within a few years, the case law will
probably mold the basic contours: Absent extremely compelling
facts or application of the wrong standard on the record,"6 ' the
trial court's determination will stand. This general rule will govern
both determinations of whether or not to require an explanation
and determinations as to the sufficiency of such explanations.
dismiss the jurors thus far selected" and "must quash any remaining venire," 377 Mass. at
488, 387 N.E.2d at 518, the court in Reid held that Soares did not intend dismissal of the
entire venire to be the only appropriate relief. 384 Mass. at 255, 424 N.E.2d at 500.
159. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Joyce, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 417, 467 N.E.2d 214 (1984);
Commonwealth v. Di Matteo, 12 Mass. App. Ct. 547, 427 N.E.2d 754 (1981).
160. California has taken this tack and has decided not to allow other remedies other
than the one set out in Wheeler. See People v. Superior Court, 157 Cal. App. 3d 55, 203 Cal.
Rptr. 519 (1984).
161. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Wood, 389 Mass. 552, 451 N.E.2d 714 (1983); Com-
monwealth v. Joyce, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 417, 467 N.E.2d 214 (1984).
162. Cf. Queenan v. Territory, 11 Okla. 261, 71 P. 218, aff'd, 190 U.S. 548 (1903) (opin-
ion by Holmes, J.) (right to challenge a juror for cause may be waived even in a capital
case).




The case law so far, although not directly on point, has sup-
ported in spirit these broad statements. The only cases decided to
date have been those in which courts have applied Neil retroac-
tively. 164 Therefore, no appellate court has yet reviewed a trial
court's determination based on its application of the Neil test.
Nevertheless, the Florida Third District Court of Appeal has re-
viewed a trial court determination on the issue and has affirmed its
respect for the discretion of the trial court.
In City of Miami v. Cornett,165 a civil suit 6 arising out of a
police shooting,' e the defendants exercised all four of their pe-
remptory challenges against black prospective jurors. Although the
plaintiff made timely objections to the defendants' peremptory
challenges, the court overruled their objections without a hearing.
The resulting all-white jury returned a verdict for the defendants.
The trial court then decided to grant Cornett a new trial, antici-
pating that the supreme court would repudiate Swain in Florida.
The trial court issued a lengthy order in which it set out its opin-
ion that the defendants had misused their peremptory chal-
lenges. 68 After Neil proved the trial court correct, the Third Dis-
trict Court of Appeal of Florida affirmed the grant of a new trial,
"[c]ognizant of Neil's view that the judge attending voir dire is in a
better position than a reviewing court to determine whether there
is a 'substantial likelihood' that peremptory challenges are being
exercised on the basis of race.""'
In view of the trial court's enormous discretion and the pau-
city of case law, it is difficult to make meaningful predictions as to
the limits of the rule. At the trial court level, determinations will
depend to a great extent on the views of the individual judge.1
7 0 It
164. Despite the explicit holding in the opinion to the contrary, Neil has been retroac-
tively applied to cases in which the issue was raised at trial and which were pending when
Neil was decided, the so-called "pipeline" cases. See, e.g., Andrews v. State, 459 So. 2d 1018
(Fla. 1985); Jones v. State, 466 So. 2d 301 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); City of Miami v. Cornett, 463
So. 2d 399 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985). Contra Wright v. State, 471 So. 2d 1295 (Fla. 5th DCA
1985).
165. Cornett, 463 So. 2d 399 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985).
166. In Cornett, the Third District Court of Appeal of Florida extended the Neil rule to
apply in civil cases. 463 So. 2d at 402.
167. Plaintiff Cornett was shot in the back while being apprehended by two police of-
ficers. He sued the City of Miami and the two officers. 463 So. 2d at 400.
168. The trial judge formed its opinion by applying the Wheeler-Soares test. Id. at 401
n.4. Even so, the Third District found that the order as a whole supported a reading of a
"substantial likelihood" of improper use of peremptories. Id. at 402.
169. Id.
170. Some judges will probably tend to question peremptories more often and then ac-
cept the justification more often. Others will not inquire until they are pretty well convinced
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is conceivable that, in rare circumstances, a trial judge might im-
pose the Neil sanction based on his observation of only one pe-
remptory challenge. 1 7 At the appellate level, it is easier to specu-
late as to the outer bounds of the Neil rule. As a general
proposition, an appellate court will probably not disturb any trial
court determination involving one or two peremptory challenges,
17 2
even if a party used them against the only members of a particular
racial group in the jury pool.173 At the other end of the spectrum,
an appellate court will probably closely scrutinize a court's refusal
to inquire into the exercise of the full statutory number of peremp-
tory challenges against members of a distinct racial group. Beyond
stating these likely limits, it is not possible to generalize; the indi-
vidual fact patterns of cases will control the outcome of the cases.
On a larger scale, Neil is presently limited to peremptory chal-
lenges based on race. 17 Nevertheless, much of what this Note ar-
gues regarding distinctions based on race is equally applicable to
distinctions based on other protected characteristics such as sex,
religion, and national origin. It is probable that in time the courts
will extend Neil to cover these areas also. The Neil one-step-at-a-
time approach will, however, tend to discourage creative lawyers
from attempting to develop new "cognizable groups.'
75
Aggressive lawyers will also probe the width of the explicit ex-
ception set out in Neil; but, they will probably find the opening
very narrow. The exception allows for systematic exclusion where
no member of a distinct group could be impartial. A reasonable
interpretation of this language is that the exception shall apply
only where the case, the parties, and the racial identity of the
group are so interrelated that a conscientious juror of that racial
group would find it difficult, if not impossible, to be impartial. This
interpretation would not encompass situations where the victim
and prospective juror, or the defendant and prospective juror, are
of the same racial group without some strong interrelationship be-
tween the parties and the facts of the case regarding race. This
of an injustice and then tend not to accept the justification of the party.
171. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Di Matteo, 12 Mass. App. Ct. 547, 427 N.E.2d 754
(1981).
172. Cf. People v. Harvey, 163 Cal. App. 3d 90, 208 Cal. Rptr. 910, 922 (1984).
173. See, e.g., People v. Rousseau, 129 Cal. App. 3d 526, 179 Cal. Rptr. 892 (1982).
174. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
175. See, e.g., Winick, Prosecutorial Peremptory Challenge Practices in Capital Cases:
An Empirical Study and A Constitutional Analysis, 81 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1982) (advocating
extension of Wheeler to "death-scrupled" jurors as a cognizable group).
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interrelationship will exist only in extraordinary cases. 76
C. A Proposed Rule Change
The Supreme Court of Florida overlooked one significant pro-
cedural matter that would have facilitated application of the Neil
procedure. Under the present Florida rules, there is no way to ob-
tain review of a trial court's disposition of a Neil motion before
completion of the entire trial.1 7 This state of affairs will not create
a problem even in the majority of non-frivolous appeals based on
Neil. Situations will undoubtedly arise, however, where a post-trial
appeal would be inadequate. 178 Once such a situation arises, it is
too late. The rules, therefore, should provide for limited access to
the appellate courts through interlocutory appeals in such cases.
Because the Supreme Court of Florida is vested with rule-
making authority,17 9 the court could have formulated such a re-
stricted appellate procedure in the Neil opinion.180 The court can
also achieve the same result by amending the Rules of Appellate
Procedure with or without the help of the advisory committee.
Minimal additions to either Rule 9.100181 or Rule 9.140182 would
176. An example of such an extraordinary case would be where three Ku Klux Klan
members, while in robes, beat a black man to death, claiming self-defense as their sole
defense.
177. See FLA. R. App. P. 9.100(a), 9.130(a). The closest possibility is a writ of prohibition
under rule 9.100(a), but such writs are restricted to cases where the lower tribunal has ex-
ceeded its jurisdiction. See Brummer, Morris & Rosen, Extraordinary Writs: A Powerful
Tool for the Florida Practitioner, 33 U. MIAMi L. REV. 1045, 1049 (1979).
178. More than diseconomy is at stake in a racially volatile community such as Miami.
The application of Neil, coupled with an interlocutory procedure for appeal, could possibly
have prevented the riots and social unrest that arose out of highly publicized cases. See
generally Appendix to Brief of Amici Curiae, State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1984).
179. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2(a).
180. Perhaps the court decided against this option because it might have lent an expan-
sive tone to an otherwise narrow opinion.
181. For example, rule 9.100(a) provides:
(a) Applicability. This rule applies to those proceedings which invoke the juris-
diciton of the courts described in Rule 9.030(a)(3); (b)(2); (b)(3); (c)(2) and
(c)(3) for the issuance of writs of mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto, certio-
rari, habeas corpus and all writs necessary to the complete exercise of the court's
jurisdiction; and for review of non-final administrative action.
Id. That provision could properly be amended by adding the phrase "and jury selection
determinations." By adding a corresponding phrase to 9.100(f) (Order to Show Cause), the
court would achieve a procedure restricted to those litigants who could show that an appeal
after final judgment would provide an inadequate remedy.
182. The court could add a subsection (F) to rule 9.140(b)(1) (Appeals by Defendant)
which would state: "Orders denying motions to strike the jury pool where review after a full
trial would be an inadequate remedy;" and could also add a subsection (J) to Rule
9.140(c)(1) (Appeals by the State) which would state: "denying a motion to strike the jury
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suffice to effect the change. In any case, the court should adopt
some restricted procedure for review of nonfinal Neil orders in
cases where review after final disposition of the case would not
provide an adequate remedy.
VI. CONCLUSION
In terms of achieving a workable resolution to the inherent
conflict in axioms: "inviolate peremptory challenges" versus "invio-
late racial equality," the Supreme Court of Florida has done the
best job of any court so far. Analysis based on the constitutional
guarantee to an impartial jury requires the repudiation of Swain
and leads inexorably to the conclusion that in limited circum-
stances the courts may question peremptory challenges. But the
significance of the Neil decision does not result from its doctrinal
conclusions; rather, it results from the procedure the court chose to
implement its conclusions and the policies that choice implicates.
The Neil procedure principally relies on the discretion of the trial
court to implememt the substantive change in the law. This proce-
dure is designed to: (1) deter and correct discriminatory uses of
peremptory challenges at a low administrative cost, (2) promote
certainty and finality of trial court determinations on the issue,
and (3) preserve the integrity of peremptory challenges. A qualita-
tive cost-benefit analysis suggests that the Neil balance will prove
to be superior to that of the Wheeler-Soares approach. But the
Supreme Court of the United States is watching, and it does not
want mere predictions; a qualitative and empirical analysis now
awaits in the Florida judicial laboratory.
JOHN W. PERLOFF
pool where review after a full trial would be an inadequate remedy." This rule amendment
would, however, only apply to criminal cases.
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